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On public service in an age of cultural consumption

The author analyses the socio-cultural changes of the closing decades of the twentieth century and discusses the notion of public service, proposing an alternative model of cultural mediation.

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A note on *Servicio Público*

The book *Servicio Público*¹ was an attempt to understand a specific historical situation and try to reflect it. This situation might be defined as a growing privatisation of public cultural services in the geo-political area of what are known as Western liberal democracies, a process that is still underway.

Today, the book seems to me to contain a number of shortcomings. At best, it offers some raw material and serves as a kind of testimony. Some of its principal inadequacies are theoretical in nature. These include a failure to define certain basic concepts such as «public» and «public service» or to justify the value given to the autonomy of culture and art in a way that does not take for granted the fallacious consensus that they are public goods. The book also lacks a convincing proposal for an alternative form of cultural mediation. These notes are intended to serve as a brief outline for ways in which those shortcomings could be overcome.

The geo-political conditions of public cultural services

In historical terms, administrative structures for culture as we know them today (ministries of culture, arts councils, etc.) first appeared roughly between 1945 and 1965. What historical conditions lay behind that development? I will outline three of them.

The first condition is related to the traumatic effects of the Great Depression that followed on the economic crash of 1929. As Eric Hobsbawm² has pointed out, the profound social and political impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s led western governments to consider for the first time the need to develop policies on care, to mitigate the possible social impact of such economic episodes.

The second condition is a more profound extension of the first: the welfare state, a

political construction that arose out of the accord reached between workers and employers following the Second World War, which aimed to keep workers' demands within the limits of the growth of profits³. The welfare state was consolidated within a historical context of prolonged political stability, marked by the coexistence of capitalism and socialism. This coexistence, arising out of the Cold War antagonism between the USA and the Soviet Union, succeeded in maintaining the global strategic and political balance for an exceptionally long period. One effect of that antagonistic coexistence was a process of mutual contamination. More specifically, it led to elements and ideas from socialism becoming incorporated into a capitalist context, resulting in the birth of social democracy. Regulatory principles and social policies were established in the capitalist area, and generally speaking there was progressive and sustained growth in public services, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. Hobsbawm describes this moment as the Golden Age of Capitalism, the moment of greatest growth and economic and social transformation in history, creating conditions that were especially propitious for the historically dispossessed classes. The key to that Golden Age, according to Hobsbawm, was that capitalism had triumphed because it was not merely capitalist⁴.

The third condition is the role of the Cold War in western cultural policies. The Cold War also had a cultural side; that is to say a battle was waged in the field of the arts between two conflicting models. The best-known case of this confrontation was that of American abstract expressionism, whereby the capitalist West —in its American variant— imposed a model of modern art based on a principle of individualism characteristic of a liberal democratic society, as opposed to the totalitarian and collectivist model of art at the service of state propaganda. The abstract art promoted in the US formed part of a sort of «political apoliticism», marking the historical moment at which the avant-garde moved from Europe to America and became the dominant ideology⁵. This identification of

avant-garde and power is a precondition for what we now understand as cultural policies. The promotion of abstract expressionism by the USIS and the MOMA laid the foundations for the emergence of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in the 1960s, that is to say, public administrative structures for culture in the United States.

From our examination of these three conditions for the development of public cultural services we can draw our first conclusion: if policies are inseparable from their historical circumstances and conditions, the same also holds true for culture and art. This leads us directly to the crux of the problem, the evidence of a paradox inherent to the principles of any cultural policy (within the field in which I am writing, that of western liberal parliamentary democracy): the «disinterested» (i.e., apolitical or pre-political) defence of art in the name of freedom and of individualism is in itself «interested» (i.e. political) in that it is based on a concept of freedom and autonomy of art that can only exist in certain historical/political circumstances. Given that no public area is entirely divorced from politics, the discourse on the autonomy of art, on which modern art in the west is based, is in itself a political construct.

If we accept this to be true, how then can we defend the democratising role of the state in culture — that is to say, as a guarantor of equality? In my opinion, we can only do so in a self-critical sense, whereby culture and art fulfil a paradoxical and contradictory role *vis-à-vis* the state. This role is, precisely, to express and safeguard the pluralist democratic order. This paradoxical condition is nowhere better expressed than in the art of institutional criticism; born in the museums, its aim is to undermine their very basis as institutions. Seen from this perspective, the conflict is at once a safeguard of that same liberal pluralism and a symptom of its limitations. It demonstrates the unequal relations of power implicit in the institutions of learning and high culture — such as the university and the museum— which play

a role in reproducing the inequalities and forms of social subordination and exclusion of the subaltern — in other words, in reproducing a social field that has no power of representation. As John Beverley explains: «[T]he university, written history, the “fine” arts, or literature, are themselves involved in the construction and maintenance of subalternity. The very idea of “studying» the subaltern [...] is self-contradictory, in a way that points to a new register of knowledge where the power of the university to understand and represent the world breaks down or reaches a limit. Recognizing the nature of this paradox means learning how to work against the grain of our own interests and prejudices — a process that involves undoing the authority of high culture, the academy, and knowledge center at the same time that we continue to participate fully in them [...] we can approach [...] closer and closer the world of the subaltern... [...] but we can never actually merge with it.... [...] [W]e seek to register instead the way in which the knowledge and practices we construct and impart are structured by the absence, difficulty or impossibility of representation of the subaltern»⁶.

This absence to which Beverley refers seems to me to be a way of highlighting the contingency of democracy and the phantasmal condition of the public sphere. As Rosalyn Deutsche describes it in her essay «Agoraphobia», «the ideal of social coherence, for which the term *public* has always stood, is itself irredeemably deceptive and, moreover, oppressive. The ideal of a non-coercive consensus reached through reason is an illusion maintained by repressing differences and particularities.... We might ask if the lost public is constructed to deny that a democratic public sphere must, in some sense, be a phantom... And what if this peculiarity of the public — that it is not here— is not inimical to, but the condition of, democracy?»⁷. Deutsche’s argument on the «place of power as an empty space» is based on Claude Lefort’s writings on democracy, a form of society whose singularity lies in the fact that those who «exercise political authority are mere

governors and cannot appropriate power, cannot incorporate it... We might think that modern democracy has instituted a new pole of identity: the sovereign people. But it would be a mistake to see this as re-establishing a fundamental unity. This unity continues to be absent»⁸. One might interpret Deleuze in similar terms when he writes that «the people no longer exist, or not yet... *the people are missing*»⁹.

The formulation and defence of a public cultural service I make in my book is, therefore, inseparable from an awareness of the very nature of democracy, a space which «to be democratic, must remain incomplete»¹⁰. From my perspective the public service is therefore a practice that has arisen out of this conception of the public sphere and seeks to establish itself within the ambit of state institutions. It is a method and an ethic for working in the cultural sphere. I shall return to this issue in examining a form of cultural mediation based on the experiences of the Museu d'Art Contemporani in Barcelona (MACBA).

The end of an era

Let us now, however, return to the historical account. What is happening today? What are the conditions in which we are living now? I would say that we are still seeing the effects of the end of an era, that «Golden Age of Capitalism» I referred to above.

According to Hobsbawm, the Golden Age collapsed following the 1973 oil crisis because the foundations on which it was built disappeared. The change in economic trends also meant the beginning of the new ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism which emerged as the chief enemy of the welfare state. In various areas of the administration, signs of erosion and retreat in public services began to be visible by the 1970s. Pierre Bourdieu described this process as the «abdication of the state»¹¹, when the collective conversion to neo-liberalism

went hand in hand with a «destruction of the idea of public service»¹². Bourdieu writes: «By making economic liberalism the necessary and sufficient condition of political freedom, they assimilate state intervention to “totalitarianism” ...efficiency and modernity [are associated] with private enterprise... [and] with the transfer into the private sector of the most profitable public services...»¹³.

The end of the Cold War and the final collapse of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s also deprived capitalism of its contrast, socialism, the political camp against which liberal democracy could identify itself. The loss of that opposition implies a risk for democracy: «the disappearance of the democracy/totalitarianism opposition that [...] had provided the main political frontier enabling discrimination between friend and enemy can lead to a profound destabilization of western societies. Indeed, it is the very identity of democracy which is at stake, in so far as its identity has depended to a large extent on the difference established with the negated other»¹⁴.

In the cultural sphere, the effects of neo-liberalism became visible in western European democracies. This was particularly true from the early 1980s on, although historically it was first consolidated in the 1970s, with the weakening and demobilization of trade union organisations and of the traditional Left, as a consequence of the economic crises of the early 1970s and the failure of the revolutionary movements of 1968. In Europe, the most eloquent example of the development of cultural policies away from the political scene and towards the economy — i.e. away from the discourse of public service and towards that of the culture industry, was that of France after the Socialist Party came to power in 1981. Jack Lang, the culture minister, was a symbol of the newly established order in Europe and from the 1980s on, the socialists' cultural policies adapted neo-liberal principles to a vaguely social-democratic populism. I believe

there are significant parallels between Spain and France in the 1980s in several senses. To start with, the socialists came to power almost simultaneously in the two countries, and remained in government long into the following decade. At the same time, unlike countries in Northern Europe, the two countries share a centralist, one might say «statist» political tradition, in which state initiative has generally held sway over civil society.

In analysing the local situation in Spain, one must begin by acknowledging that when public systems of culture were first appearing in European liberal democracies, the country was still living under a totalitarian regime. In other words, the political conditions for the construction of a modern liberal-democratic state did not arise in Spain at the same time as elsewhere (i.e. after the Second World War and during the Golden Age of capitalism). This makes it somewhat difficult for someone such as myself wishing to re-examine and defend the sense of public service inherent to the state in its modern liberal-democratic conception, because it means that I am championing something that never actually happened (in other words, a doubly phantasmal cause)¹⁵. Nonetheless, I assume that task here as a process, or working method, and will use it as a general proposal for action.

Towards an alternative model of cultural mediation

Any project of cultural policy today must begin with two observations. The first concerns the new centrality of culture. As early as 1984, Fredric Jameson famously described this centrality in his theorisation of postmodernism: «[w]hat we have been calling postmodernism is inseparable from, and unthinkable without the hypothesis of, some fundamental mutation of the sphere of culture in the world of late capitalism, which includes a momentous modification of its social function. (...) [T]he dissolution of an

autonomous sphere of culture is rather to be imagined in terms of an explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life... [...] can be said to have become “cultural” in some original and untheorized sense»¹⁶. More recently, others have contributed to this theorisation. They include Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, with their category of «immaterial work» in a post-Fordist stage of the capitalist economy, in which the services and the tertiary sector occupy the central role previously played by industrial manufacture in the Fordist stage of capitalism. Negri and Hardt write, «Since the production of services results in no material and durable good, we define the labor involved in this production as *immaterial labor* —that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication»¹⁷. Jameson, Negri and Hardt all agree on «the increasing indistinguishability of economic and cultural phenomena»¹⁸.

A second observation concerns the continued process of privatisation of public services, described in *Servicio Público*, as a symptom of the progressive dismantling of the welfare state. Once again Negri and Hardt refer to this process of privatisation as a dynamic that is inherent to capitalism: «There has been a continuous movement throughout the modern period to privatize public property... Capitalism sets in motion a continuous cycle of private reappropriation of public goods: the expropriation of what is common... the rise and fall of the welfare state in the twentieth century is one more cycle in this spiral of public and private appropriations... the immanent relation between the public and the common is replaced by the transcendent power of private property»¹⁹.

In such a context, our purpose is not so much to mount a nostalgic defence of some supposed essential values of the public sphere, embodied in an ideal of republican virtue, but to search for working methods that will counter the current situation's limitations on democracy and

emancipation. As Negri and Hardt say, «It is our turn now to cry out: “Big government is over!”. Why should this slogan be the exclusive property of the conservatives?»²⁰. Or as Lefort says: «resist the temptation to trade the present for the future; make the effort, on the contrary, to read in the present the possible paths towards the future, paths which are indicated through the defence of the rights we have acquired and by demanding new ones...»²¹.

A project of cultural policy based on the principles of radical democracy, such as that defined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, needs to abandon the notion of essentialist universality and the conception of the public sphere as something that can be reduced to a unitary space, homogenous and consensual. It is therefore inseparable from the notion of pluralism, in which the different collective subjects are in constant negotiation and conflict: «experience of democracy should consist of the recognition of the multiplicity of social logics along with the necessity of their articulation. But this articulation should be constantly re-created and renegotiated, and there is no final point at which a balance will be definitively achieved»²². The goal of a project of radical pluralist democracy must be to take the direction of the multiplication of public spaces. In very simple terms, I believe this to be the nub of the notion of a *public service*, working within the structures of the state to promote the decentralisation of power and to create spaces and moments in which different subjects and groups can avail of the resources of the state, thus encouraging processes of self-education and relative autonomy.

Welfare museum²³

I will conclude here with some specific examples that may help the reader imagine what other *modi operandi* of cultural mediation are possible today. I will take these from our experiences at MACBA and the

specific work we have been carrying out over the last three years.

The museum's work has been oriented towards building a critical memory of the art of the second half of the twentieth century, through collecting and through exhibitions and other activities. The goal of this work is to counteract the hegemonic discourses and forces that tend towards a mythification of the local/national sphere and use cultural institutions as active agents in transforming cities into tertiary economies. It also seeks to offer alternatives to the inadequate models of museum that currently prevail, generally based on the universalist myth of the original work or a conception of the museum-as-spectacle²⁴.

Our approach in the museum has been inspired, among other sources, by Laclau and Mouffe's project of radical democracy. The notion of pluralism has thus been translated into an understanding of the public as comprising specific differentiated groups. This approach is diametrically opposed to the generic notion of the public as something that can be reduced to purely quantitative, statistically measurable criteria. This notion is applied in populist cultural policies based on a model of TV consumption, wherein the effectiveness of the product is measured by its mass success, i.e. by its acceptance among an abstract and undifferentiated public. One need hardly labour the point here, but there is a clear link between this notion of the public and the principles of private profit and the most regressive and alienating of cultural products.

This pluralist understanding of audiences affects the very way the productive function of the museum and its hierarchy are conceived. The museum ceases to be a mere producer of exhibitions to become a provider of different types of services for different subjects. Likewise, the exhibition is one way of obtaining an experience, but it need not be prioritised over others. The museum also produces workshops, lectures, audiovisual programmes, publications, online projects, etc., all geared towards

different groups' forms of production and their needs for training and socialisation. One can easily imagine users of the museum who might only be interested in certain ones of these activities and this is perfectly legitimate.

This pluralist conception of the museum's public programmes also requires us to redefine our terminology. Thus, the term «education», invested as it is with connotations of over-institutionalised discipline and associated with a hierarchical relationship and the conveyance of certain pre-established knowledge, seems unsuitable when it comes to discussing a working process based on negotiation. We therefore prefer to use the more neutral term *mediation* to define the diversity of relations that can be established between the museum and its public. Those potential relations always contain some degree of indecisiveness and unpredictability, which in each particular case needs to be resolved by means of specific negotiations. The basis of the working dynamic is to encourage the creation and continuity of groups. Let us now examine some specific cases.

The *Las Agencias* project, carried out during the first half of last year, arose out of an attempt to create a common and de-hierarchised working space for artists and social movements. It came in answer to the museum's search for other forms of mediation through a third element or agency that would act as an intermediary between the institution and the social groups. *Las Agencias* managed to build a climate of relative trust towards the museum among sectors of society that are generally extremely reluctant to get involved with the instituted powers. The museum could not conceal its commanding architectural presence in the El Raval district of Barcelona. Nor could it deny its role in transforming the social composition of the district as the result of a planning policy implemented by local powers from the 1980s on (this policy had sought to utilize cultural

institutions as agents of social élitization and urban revaluation, and to promote the city as a tourist destination). Nonetheless, we managed to some extent to draw a distinction between that planning policy and the institution itself. The *Las Agencias* project combined the energy of various Barcelona social movements at a particularly active moment, following the call for projects for the World Bank meeting, due to be held in the city in June 2001 (The event was eventually cancelled out of government fears about social responses). The central role of anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation in the social movements led *Las Agencias* to become involved in some of the campaigns being organised in that context and at that time in the city.

Las Agencias was an experiment in self-education. The working dynamic was such that the museum was not the hierarchical authority providing contents. Instead it limited its action to providing certain resources to allow the groups to define their own contents and establish their programmes of activities with a relative degree of autonomy, depending on their specific interests and needs²⁵. Another project sought to redefine the protocols on use of the exhibition space and its hybridization with non-traditional devices of visibility; this was the project built around the work of Pere Portabella, *Historias sin argumento. El cine de Pere Portabella (Plotless Stories: The Films of Pere Portabella)*, which was presented at the museum in early 2001. The exhibition combined an exhibition, an *à-la-carte* archive of audio-visual and bibliographical material which users could consult on demand, a cinema and a series of activities including an audio-visual programme, a seminar and a series of lectures. The framework offered a historical discourse narrating the relevance of Portabella's work as a film-maker within the context of the new cinema of the 1960s and 1970s. However, it also left room for another possible engagement, both through the lecture programme (in which the guests suggested other forms of engagement) and the *à-la-carte* materials, which allowed each user to build their own

narrative. In this way, the device managed to avoid fetishizing and mythifying the figure of the artist, and thus to avoid fixing his historical role through the logic of a tribute. Instead, it fostered a reinterpretation and opened the way to other approaches, present and future. This project might be seen as an example of how the museum can learn from its critics — in this case from institutional critics — and transform itself into a relatively more transparent context, open to interaction, and in a certain way to «demuseify it», that is, to free itself to a certain extent from some of its more rigid, resistant and authoritarian historical baggage²⁶.

Finally, the video and cinema programme *Buen Rollo. Políticas de resistencia y culturas musicales (Good Vibes: Politics of Resistance and Musical Culture)*, scheduled to run between February and July this year was born out of the idea of taking literally the *Thank God It's Friday*²⁷ strapline «They came to dance, but ended up getting an education». The programme is designed to showcase some of the movements or styles in commercial popular music of the last thirty years, with particular stress on social and political aspects in the formation of these styles. *Buen Rollo* comes in two formats, each of which can be used in a separate way: as a series of screenings and as an on-demand consultation service²⁸.

It is no coincidence that the subject of *Buen Rollo* is the subculture surrounding different musical styles. These subcultures form an environment where we can find an especially eloquent form of some of the social practices theorised in the project of radical democracy. For example, the various styles are presented as attempts to create relatively autonomous identities in response to certain contexts and starting from the available material culture. Some punk expressions from the late 1970s such as «no future» or «do it yourself» presaged what Laclau has defined as the «spatialization» of

the political²⁹. This contrasts with the «temporal understanding, based on a future projection of a different kind. This is best exemplified in political forms of direct action, which seek to have an immediate impact on the present. We also see how the practices associated with the raves of Thatcher's Britain have developed into new carnivalesque practices in political protest and public expression, becoming common tools among the anti-globalisation movements. At the same time, musical subcultures have formed an essential playing field for creating communication and distribution networks, standing as they do outside the hegemonic circuits of commercial culture. They have also provided a favourable milieu for formalising and expressing practices of identity transgression through corporeal mechanisms and habits that subvert the prevailing codes of gender identity through the use of clothing, tattoos and drug consumption, in parallel with new theories on the pre-formative and socially articulated character of gender identities.

Finally, musical subcultures also offer a propitious ground for considering the ambivalence and contradictions of culture as a counter-hegemonic space for resistance and transgression in the face of the neutralising capacity of commercial culture. All in all, we find in this context real examples of new policies of experience and we can safely state that the dissemination of new forms of community and networks of relationship is not simply something that is there to be imagined, but something that is already taking place.

Postscriptum

In this essay, I have tried to offer a historical and theoretical perspective of the public cultural service and at the same time to give an account of a specific action, tying in my experience in making the book *Servicio Público* with my subsequent experience at MACBA. What I say here cannot be disassociated from that personal experience and it is not intended to stand on its own as a role model. This is one way of working, but it by no means excludes others. What still remains for us to do is a process of self-criticism of the projects organised in the museum, projects to which I have necessarily referred only very briefly.

Notes and references

- 1 **Ribalta, Jorge** (ed.), *Servicio público. Conversaciones sobre financiación pública y arte contemporáneo*, Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca-UAAV, 1998.
- 2 «The Great Slump forced Western governments to give social considerations priority over economic ones in their state policies». **Hobsbawm, Eric**, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London: **Michael Joseph**, 1994, p. 95.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 284.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 344. Part Two of **Hobsbawm's** book is devoted to this topic (The Golden Age), pp. 225-402.
- 5 **Guilbaut, Serge**, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War*, trans. **Arthur Goidhammer**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. On this same issue, see also the conversations with **George Yúdice** and **Andrea Fraser** in Jorge Ribalta (ed.), *Servicio público*. Op. cit.
- 6 **Beverley, John**, «Theses on Subalternity, Representation and Politics (in response to Jean-Francois Chevrier)», in *Subcultura i homogeneització*, (Barcelona) Fundació Antoni Tàpies, 1998, pp. 130-31.
- 7 **Deutsche, Rosalyn**, *Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics*, Chicago/Cambridge: Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts/MIT Press, 1996, pp. 320, 321, 324.
- 8 **Lefort, Claude**, «Democracia y advenimiento de un lugar vacío» in *La invención democrática*, Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 1990, pp. 190-91.
- 9 **Deleuze, Gilles**, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. **Hugh Tomlinson** and **Robert Galatea**, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, P. 216.
- 10 *Deutsche*, Op. cit., p. 326. On this same issue, see also the conversations with **Hans Haacke**, **Rainer Rochlitz** and **Daniel Buren** and the epilogue in *Servicio Público*, Op. Cit.
- 11 **Bourdieu, Pierre**, (ed.), *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 181.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 182
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 182-183
- 14 **Mouffe, Chantal**, *The Return of the Political*, London: Verso, 1993, pp. 3-4.
- 15 This incomplete modernity is not exclusive to the political and economic history of Spain. Using the Italian economy of the 1950s, **Negri** and **Hardt** explain that «relatively backward economies do not simply follow the same stages the dominant regions experience, but evolve through alternative and mixed patterns» and speak also in these cases of «mixtures of different incomplete economic forms». **Negri, Antonio** and **Hardt, Michael**, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 288. **Néstor García Canclini** was alluding to this same situation, although from another perspective when he wrote of «strategies for entering and leaving modernity»

- in his book *Hybrid Cultures*, trans. **Christopher L. Chiappari** and **Silvia L. Lopez** Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
- 16 **Jameson, Frederic**, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1991, pp. 47-8.
- 17 **Negri and Hardt**, Op. cit., p. 290.
- 18 Ibid., p. 275.
- 19 Ibid., p. 300-301.
- 20 Ibid., p. 349.
- 21 **Lefort, Claude**, *L'invention démocratique. «Les limites de la domination totalitaire»*, Paris, Fayard, 1981, p. 83.
- 22 **Laclau, Ernesto** and **Mouffe, Chantal**, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed., London: Verso, 2001, p. 188. On the multiplication of public spaces as part of the project of radical democracy, see also **Laclau, Ernesto**, *New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time*, London: Verso, 1990, pp. XI-XVI.
- 23 I have borrowed this expression from **Joan Roca**, who uses the term «welfare neighborhood» to refer to the work of the Instituto Barri Besòs, where he is a teacher, to generate new activities around the educational work and beyond, with the collaboration and support of the neighbourhoods in which it works.
- 24 See the material available in → www.macba.es
- 25 See → www.lasagencias.es
- 26 For further information see the publication coordinated by **Expósito, Marcelo**, *Historias sin argumento. El cine de Pere Portabella*, Valencia-Barcelona, Ediciones de la Mirada-MACBA, 2001.
- 27 Cited in **Gilbert, Jeremy** and **Pearson, Ewan**. *Discographies. Dance Music, Culture and the Politics of Sound*, London, Routledge, 1999, p.1.
- 28 For further information, see → www.macba.es/bonrotllo.html
- 29 **Laclau**. Op. cit., p. 41.